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DEVOURING THE LEVIATHAN 
Fiscal Policy and Public Expenditure in Colombia 
Fernando Estrada 
 
The hypothesis  
Overall, this paper presents a white swan that seems to confirm the hypothesis of 
Alesina / Tabellini / Campante (2008). Fiscal policy in many developing countries is 
procyclical. Specifically, the former may explain monetary policy failures associated 
with problems of political agency. And in this case, the trend of the cycles is caused by 
voters who seek to devour the Leviathan by reducing their incomes. In these cases, 
voters observe the conditions of the economy, but not willing to cover the costs of 
corrupt governments. When they observe a boom, voters optimally demand more public 
goods or lower taxes, and this induces a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. The empirical 
evidence is consistent with this explanation: Procyclicality of fiscal policy is more 
pronounced in more corrupt democracies. 
This hypothesis, however, contains significant variations in the case of Colombia. From 
a general perspective, one could argue that large state transformations are reflected in 
income, expenditure and employment. The information that has the National 
Department of Statistics, DANE, on income (tax and nontax) is easier and more orderly 
than spending and employment. This difference is explained, in part because in 
Colombia the collection of taxes is more centralized (national, municipal and 
departmental) while spending the ramifications is many. 
Since the political reforms introduced by the 1991 Constitution, the expectations of 
taxpayers are confused with the voracity of the voter. State size continues to grow, 
while the control of fiscal spending is inefficient. The claims of benefits exceed tax 
payments. Moreover, public spending is diverted to politicians and the main actors of 
violence: the insurgents and paramilitaries. The capture of state revenue comes from 
above legislation favoring special interests. And local government level by the threat 
and violence of armed conflict. This anomaly of politics in this work relates to the 
image of a Leviathan devoured. 
This paper aims to counteract the cyclical hypotheses. That can be summarized in these 
terms: The central bank and government after the 1999 crisis adopted a counter-cyclical 
management of the economy through the slowdown in inflation and stability of public 
expenditure. The state has limited its intervention in the areas of expenditure and 
legislative acts of public power are reduced. The conventional critique of this version is 
one of the objectives of this document. 
The size of the state in Colombia has no resemblance to the idea of minimum state of 
Robert Nozick (1974). There is a state limited to the defense of private property and 
individual freedoms. Consequently, it reflects a classic liberal state. Nor is a state that 
plays perfect justice as fairness of John Rawls (1971). Also to the 1991 Constitution is 
Rawlsian spirit. In economic policy management system describes a Keynesian, with a 
fiscal balance depends on the central bank
1
. 
 
The problem 
In Colombia, statistics from the National Department of Statistics, DANE, on the public 
sector should help monitoring of the modalities of state intervention in the economy. As 
they are now das organization, allow us to find major trends of the state and their 
relative importance in the overall economy. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions 
about the way has reconstituted public spending over time. DANE has not kept the 
number of expenditure by purpose. This lack makes the understanding of the specific 
form as the State has intervened in the economy. Consequently, it is desirable that the 
DANE regain the series ends. The information on employment and public wages has 
not been maintained consistently. The series was discontinued. 
  
From a general perspective, we can say that the great transformations of the state 
reflected in the income, expenditure and employment. The information that have DANE 
income (tax and nontax) is simpler and ordered that the spending and employment. This 
difference is explained in part because the collection of taxes is more centralized 
(Nation, municipalities and departments), while spending the ramifications are 
manifold.  
 
In fiscal theory insist that the way it is funded by the state is determinant to understand 
their behavior and the impact it has on economy activity. However, the DANE statistics 
is not possible to check the characteristics of monetary and financial policy. The 
information with which account is mainly related to real sector accounts. This limits the 
general scope of this investigation. Indeed, his goal is to propose an analytical 
framework that is used to systematize information on monetary and fiscal policy.  
 
 
Theories of state in the economy 
 
The relationship between the state and economy can be classified according to criteria 
willing.  
 
                                                             
1 This work contains the contributions of research: The function of state in the economy was conducted 
with the collaboration of Jorge I. Gonzalez, Alberto Castrillon and Mauricio Perez. Study for the DANE 
in 2008. 
From the historical point of view could review the various transformations of the state 
to economic management: state mercantilist of physiocrats, liberal, socialist, and mixed. 
A second perspective of analysis has to do with market failure and its correction by 
government intervention: externalities, tragedy of the commons, provision of public 
goods, monopolies, environmental concerns, transparency of information, collective 
action, institutional problems (Estrada, 2008). This debate has led to consider also the 
failings of government, including topics such as the inefficiency of the public sector, 
particularly public enterprise, public monopolies and corruption. In addition, 
interactions between state and market have been analyzed from different perspectives
2
, 
but in the case of Colombia it has been paid attention to the role of government in the 
context of comparative political theory (Tovar 1984, Kalmanovitz 2001)
3
. There is, 
then, a unified language for understanding how state policy affects employment, 
controlling inflation, economic growth and macroeconomic stability (Londoño 1995). 
The approaches are very incomplete and partial (Ocampo 1992). Finally, from a 
substantive point of view, the discussion could revolve around theories of social choice 
(Arrow 1951, Sen 1970), and public choice (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).  
In fact the three components are not excluded. With the historical evolution, the state 
has depended on the scope and programs implemented by each government. The second 
line of analysis highlights the boundary conditions of market mechanisms and the need 
to keep up a relative separation between the different spheres of power. The third 
component relates one of the most important analytical advances in economic theory of 
the twentieth century. 
 
 
Historical perspective 
  
The contract and Leviathan 
 
At the beginning of capitalism comes the natural law that inaugurates a new conception 
of society and the person. This theory sanctions the rise of the bourgeoisie as a new 
class in power, which structures the economic relations in a way completely different 
from the legacy of the Old Regime. The new order hinges on the person, not the family, 
as in the Thomistic Aristotelian tradition. The emerging economic order is not 
                                                             
2 Ver, por ejemplo, Przeworski y Curvale (2007), Fitoussi (2004), Casarico y Devillanova (2007). 
3 In the Colombian academic tradition in comparative political analysis are rather few. The abundant 
literature on basic concepts of public administration or constitutionalism, lack the analytic property that 
can be noted in an appropriate manner the doctrine of relations between theoretical and practical problems 
of Colombian society. Work on state theory in a context of international negotiations (Uprimny 2001, 
García, 2006, Moncayo, 2006). 
 
supported by the oikos, house, but in the relations established between people. Thus 
arise the need for political conditions where such transactions can be developed reliably. 
Hobbes (1651) proposed the existence of a Leviathan, which can deliver the property 
and to set up the conditions for access to it possible. The Leviathan is an artificial man. 
His soul is sovereignty. It is the commonwealth, the civitas, the state. Thus emerged the 
social contract, in which some people abdicate their freedom and power to which it can 
keep life and property. In the absence of such conditions, the life of humans, Hobbes 
says, is lonely, miserable, brutal and short. And there could flourish industry, 
navigation, agriculture, arts and letters. 
 
The state under the commercial ideas 
For the goal of mercantilist economy is to serve the best interests of the Prince and, 
ultimately, to the interests of the state. The economy is not conceived as an end in itself 
but to enlarge the national power. A clear purpose in the mercantilist literature is the 
consolidation of national unity. The establishment of national power helps reduce the 
enormous costs of transaction that involved the existence of several territorial units with 
jurisdiction, units of weights and measures other, unsafe roads, etc. 
Between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, mercantilism is not nothing but a 
commercial war between countries in training. The economy is seen as a zero sum 
game, where if a country makes money when you do so at the cost of another which 
loses. The excessive regulation on the economy is related primarily to the state supreme 
destinations. The consolidation of the nationals states through the decline of medieval 
practices
4
. The state power is a recurring theme in the literature of mercantilism. 
 
The state of the Physiocrats  
The Physiocrats refer specifically to the kindness of state intervention in the economy. 
The problem considered in the light of what happened to the absolutist states. An 
anecdote, probably false, it gives Mercier de la Rivière Physiocrat the following 
comment to Catherine of Russia, when it asked for advice about how to govern his 
people well: 
  
 
Do not feel any concern now for our moral. It is socially impossible that they are not 
shaped by its principles, it is socially impossible for men living under the laws as 
simple-ownership and free markets that men who once arrived to the knowledge of just 
                                                             
4 … at the time, central state power seemed essential to break the feudal barriers to trade, recruitment of 
individual liberties, the dynamics of emerging cities with their factories and also to support the 
commercial and colonial expansion overseas' (Cuevas 2007, p. 20). 
 
what all have had to an order whose foundation is justice and whose essence these 
advantages are obvious to them, are not, human talking the most virtuous men "(quoted 
in Gomez 1998, pp. 319-320). 
 
Just the Physiocrats attributed the phrase laissez faire, laissez passer, le monde va de lui 
même. State intervention in the economy is counterproductive because it involves 
altering a natural order that works perfectly. It makes little sense, such as, treated by 
state intervention to ease the effects of the market on the poor, because this 
phenomenon is not wanted by anyone. It is a result of natural laws that run without 
human hands, the better the state, has a bearing on it. Nevertheless, the rule is assigned 
a particular function within the general guidance here considered: 
  
 
Public enlightenment on the natural law and for the proper illustration of the people in 
the use of reason, the positive legislation and enforcement of agreements do with natural 
law, not only in terms of general rights and freedoms, if -not as the embodiment of the 
institutions that guarantee competition, with its particular result of conversion of profit 
in a maximized mirage of the dedication of each person in the service of others, the 
provision of essential infrastructure, an ideal taxation not random or arbitrary, according 
to natural law and its attendant harmony between the interests public and private, and 
regulation on the activities of which depends in strategic economic system, with 
freedom for the others (Cuevas 2002, pp. 71-72). 
Surprisingly, the father of the medical school has been the French royal house, François 
Quesnay. And the surprise is that the Physiocrats sought to redefine the relationship 
between the monarchy and classes. Somehow it was shaping "the intellectual origins of 
the French Revolution”.  
 
Liberalism in the state 
The liberal view on the state has been distorted in the heat of the ideological debates. 
Classical thinking has little to do with the claims of contemporary liberalism. For Adam 
Smith the State must comply with the following tasks: defending the nation, providing 
justice, infrastructure that can help the trade. In The Wealth of Nations (Smith 1776), it 
is clear that the government exists to protect the property
5
. The rescue does Smith 
(1759) shows that moral sentiment in his vision of social relations, the presence of 
others is crucial. The exercise of impartiality (sympathy) is needed to build a just 
society
6
. And this concern for others is the foundation of contemporary social 
                                                             
5 "... is only under the protection of the civil magistrate that the person who owns the property, acquired 
by the work of many years, or through successive generations, can sleep in peace "(Smith 1776). 
6 Hurtado, (2006) 
protection. 
After the estate society and the era of absolutism, liberalism was presented as an 
alternative profoundly revolutionary. For example, is shown as a severe critic of the 
motley mercantilist regulations. Mercantilist practices are considered wrong. Liberalism 
was interested; above all, limit the power to keep the right to freedom. The liberal state 
 
... Is a reaction against the old regime, a social order and a very different political, 
economic manifestation of which was the unionism, and royalties. And so, in this 
reaction arise the basic limits of the liberal state: economic liberalism, state policeman, 
state-society separation, separation between private and public law right, liberty and 
property and rights guaranteed, and so on. (Ariño, 2003, p. 63) 
 
 
In fact, relates a tradition that goes back to Locke, the state should be limited to 
functions that have to protect life, freedom and property. The ideas of classical 
liberalism should not be confused with the contemporary neoconservative ideology that 
seeks to make the market all the other spheres of society (González 2003). There would 
be a kind of liberalism strong (classical), and a weak one, which clearly reflects the 
Colombian liberal party. The weak liberalism has not been seriously committed to the 
tenets of classical thought
7
. 
 
The state in the Socialist ideas 
In contrast to liberalism, socialist ideas assigned to the state of paramount importance. 
In the conflict between personal and society, socialism committed to the community. 
The production or the property is conceived as a social product. The socialists, 
considered generically, say that the market does not notice that the contributions of 
people are unequal due to unequal starting from first conditions. 
Within the socialist tradition, there are more extreme versions like those of Stalin which 
postulates the existence of a party dictatorship to manage the production, distribution 
and consumption through the abolition of private property. Social democracy accepts 
Marx (1867) that the industrial proletariat is crucial in economic management, but 
respects the rules of democracy. In fact, European social democracy committed to the 
defense finished the welfare state, institutions and develop mechanisms to mitigate the 
perverse effects on equality and fairness capitalism brings. One could say that different 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
7
 This trial of modern and contemporary Liberalism, with respect to classical Liberalism, has presented a 
unique way Friedrich Hayek in his essay recognized: Hayek, Friedrich A. (2001), Principios de un orden 
social liberal, Unión Editorial, S. A. Madrid; Hayek, Friedrich, A. (1988), The Fatal Conceit: The Errors 
of Socialism (The Collected Works of Friedrich August Hayek, Volume I) Rutledge y Chicago University 
Press.   
traditions have in common is a maximalist place to economic management: the market 
is incapable of self-regulation and therefore need the intervention in economic activity. 
In short, socialists share the belief that for the sake of social justice, the property must 
have severe limitations, up to its complete abolition when necessary. 
 
Mixed state 
The polarization between bourgeois and proletarian announced Marx and Engels in The 
Manifesto of the Communist Party inspired the thinking of leading economists in the 
first half of the twentieth century. Walras, Marshall and Keynes sought alternatives to 
build an open society without giving up private ownership of the means of production. 
The mixed state emerges as a proposal capable of taking over the objections raised by 
the inability of socialism to capitalism to solve problems of equity and social 
sustainability of the system. Similarly, attempts to remedy the problems of incentives, 
information and production efficiency are the major obstacles to the socialist project. 
 Keynes is often cited (1936) as the main supporter of this current, although the New 
Deal is prior to the publication of Keynes's major work. For Keynes, the economy and 
its institutions, while human works, not strictly necessary, are contingent. Uncertainty is 
a feature of the economy because we simply can not know the future. Keynes believes 
that: 
 
Mainstream economists are a kind of candid that, having departed from this world to 
cultivate their gardens, they preach that everything is the best way in the perfect 
possible worlds, provided we leave things in the wild (Keynes 1936, p. 40) 
 
The ideas of Keynes mediate between radical liberalism and socialism, between the 
minimal state of laissez-faire and the greatest state of socialism. The economy mixed 
Keynesian aims to bridge the tradeoff between the efficiency preached by liberalism and 
fairness sought by the socialists. 
In addition to theoretical reasons, the emergence of mixed economies was also a need 
resulting from the reality of capitalism, which highlighted the failures of self-regulation. 
State intervention after the crisis of the twenties was necessary. From the economic 
point of view yielded the space competition to monopoly concentration. And from a 
social perspective, government intervention in the economy was a demand for people 
hit by the crisis. Moreover, after the World War II, the English electorate chose the 
proposals of the Socialist Clement Attlee in place of the Conservative Winston 
Churchill. State intervention was a requirement of the system. It was necessary to save 
the same time the economy and democracy. The other options were fascism and 
communism. 
For at least 30 years since the end of World War II until the crisis of the seventies, very 
few dared to challenge the consensus arising from the exercise of democracy. State 
emerged entrepreneur, promoter, regulatory, welfare, mixed economy, etc. The way 
behind is that the market is not self-sufficient. Moreover, it recognizes that no 
regulation and no market without intervention. 
 
The return of Liberalism 
 The crisis of the seventies made it impossible to hold the post-war consensus. 
Stagflation, or inflation with unemployment, was interpreted as the failure of Keynesian 
policies (Friedman 1976). Management issues, information, inefficient use of resources, 
elimination of competition, inflation, etc.., led to the privatization and deregulation 
program developed during the reign of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the 
United States and England respectively, In Chile, after the coup of 1973 had already 
developed similar policies. In practice, these programs seek the withdrawal of 
government control of economies. With the endorsement of the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, universities and think tanks, these ideas spread rapidly by 
almost all countries, including the former socialist countries.  
State intervention was questioned because it does not help to solve the problems of 
justice that are supposedly generated by the capitalist system. Friedman was one of the 
economists who inspired the deregulation policies of the U.S. and Latin American 
economies. To sprout the passage to those who argue that the market can generate 
perverse effects on some people, and that in such cases the state should intervene, 
Friedman (1966, p. 242) replied that "a resource we have, and in some sense the most 
desirable, is charity”. Similarly Hayek shall act "in a market economy makes no sense 
the idea of social justice" (1973, P.21). 
Friedman / Hayek are the counterpart of Keynes. Technocracy was far beyond the scope 
of the proposals of Friedman and Hayek. In a way, he said, the government failures are 
more serious than market failures. The main flaws imputed to him the state are: 
information suppresses supplying the market, eliminates or restricts competition, 
technological backwardness occasions, gives incentives for corrupt practices are, 
distorts the efficient use of resources, it distorts the labor market, creates problems in 
terms of political freedom, etc. 
  
An alternative way through the basic income  
It is necessary to look at the experience of each country, with its peculiar institutional 
variables and their political economy constraints. Amartya Sen believes that the choice 
between market and state is a false dilemma:  
 
... the fact of recognizing the virtues of the market should not lead us to ignore the 
possibilities and the achievements already recorded by the state or, on the contrary, 
consider the market as a success factor, independent of any government policy. In fact, 
many Western European countries have managed to give a comprehensive social 
security, covering both public education and health care, until then unknown in the rest 
of the world, in Japan and East Asia, the government has taken reins in the 
transformation of its economy and society, education and health care have played a 
central role in social and economic changes around the world (and quite spectacular in 
the case of East and Southeast Asia); and pragmatic policy has inspired both state 
institutions and / or the market as in organisms that do not correspond to any of these 
categories is, as are so-called community-based organizations "(Amartya K. Sen 1998). 
The issues of equity, freedom, efficiency and development have become cornerstones of 
contemporary moral philosophy. The assumptions of mainstream economics have been 
subjected to an intense debate that has highlighted the main constraints to do a society 
that can act freely. If that is the challenge facing societies, no matter what specific form 
the state
8
. 
 One issue that comes to snack in the current debate about the relationship between state 
and economy is the basic income (Basic Income) for all citizens (Van Parijs 1995). For 
Van Parijs democracy is compatible with capitalism. This author believes that 
capitalism is a preliminary stage of socialism. The dynamics of the capitalist economy 
does not take into account the problems of political representation of citizens in a state 
that is subordinated to the interests of dominant groups. Basic income is defined as a  
"... income allocated by the State enough to meet basic needs, regardless of the status of 
the recipient ... Basic income increased autonomy and freedom of people, and gives 
them dignity ability to cope with its existence. Many economists have doubts about the 
economic feasibility of such a proposal "(Castrillon 2006, p. 328). 
 Brazil has discussed the issue. Article 1 of the bill-swim was in 2001, reads:  
"Art 1. Hereby established, starting in 2005, the income of citizens, that established the 
right of all Brazilians living in the country, and foreign residents, have for at least five 
years in Brazil, regardless of their socio-economic to receive, annually, a monetary 
benefit". 
 
Liberal state to state regulator 
In contemporary societies have expanded the regulatory functions of the state on the 
economy activities meet standards and criteria determined by the state (Estrada, 2009). 
In Colombia, the Social State of Law, the 1991 Constitution requires the organization 
and the administration should serve the needs of citizens. To make this possible requires 
that the information is a public good. It also needs to strengthen the institutional and 
                                                             
8
 For Evans, "like it or not, the state has a central role in the process of structural change, even if that 
change is defined as structural adjustment. Recognition of this central role goes back, inevitably, to issues 
related to the ability of the state" (Evans 1996). 
legal security
9
. This is reflected in proper mechanisms of accountability and transparent 
management. 
  
Today it is recognized that the concept of "state employer", as the agent directly 
responsible for the provision of goods and services, should focus on areas particularly 
sensitive on the basis either strategic, or economic viability. The crisis of the seventies 
called into question the concept of "state business." In recent years, many companies 
that were nationalized after World War II returned to private hands. The main functions 
that today are attributed to the State mentioned three: promotion, regulation and 
control
10
. 
 
Employer state 
 Until a few decades ago it was thought that the State could be a good substitute for the 
market in all those activities that were in between the "public interest”. Concern for the 
collective was directly related to the state apparatus. It was believed that markets were 
not the public interest because they were motivated solely by profit. The idea was, then, 
that public services, telecommunications, railways, mining, infrastructure, steel, etc., 
Were in state hands. Vision Colombia 2019. For the notion of public enterprise is 
inherently contradictory
11
. 
  
State drive 
 The figure of the state impeller has a central place in literature. However, it is easy to 
show the process of industrialization could hardly have been carried out without the 
state. The "miracle" Asia was made possible through strong leadership and explicit state 
(World Bank 2000)
12
. After World War II, the consensus was that if the State had been 
                                                             
9 Institutions reduce uncertainty because they offer us a structure that directs the daily living (North 1990, 
p. 3). 
10
 The Uribe administration has expressed his vision of the ideal state: "In 2019 the Colombian 
government, at the national level, will be specialized in the exercise of sovereign functions: justice, 
security, foreign relations, economic intervention and social management of risk. This involves the 
consolidation of the policy for decentralization, efficiency and institutional transparency, strengthening 
the links between public and private sector and effective participation of citizens "(DNP 2005). 
11 "... the conceptual basis of this review of the analysis of the contradictions involved the concept of a 
public company, since it operates in a business scenario is based on freedom and private property, and 
mobile, benefit, while the public is part of the political system and, therefore, the interests that motivate 
are fundamentally political and not for profit "(DNP 2005, p. 328). 
12 Some of the policies that were assumed by the state in the successful Asian economies challenge the 
current consensus about the way the relationship would be implemented between states and market it. We 
mentioned the main ones: i) Protection of domestic market enterprises, and even no chance to compete in 
foreign markets. ii) Intensive program to replace imports iii) Improving governance, which is not 
necessarily consistent with the canons Western democracy iv) Exchange rate policy that promotes 
exports. v) Subsidized credit for business vi) Training of the workforce that would be demanded by 
able to manage the economy during the war also could do for peace. A happy 
expression of this conception is the formulation of the Development Plan the four 
strategies, designed by economist Lauchlin Currie, who years ago was near the New 
Deal program
13
. 
 According to Schonfield (1967), the structure of market economies in developed 
countries after the war is deeply Government Printer driver, i.e. a state that has the 
ability to induce certain behavior by private sector through the incentive schemes that 
frame but not replace private initiative. In other words, these incentives can be negative 
(e.g., industrialization through import restrictions, typical of the economic policy of the 
United States in the nineteenth century and the Latin American countries during the 
second half of the twentieth century) or positive. In the second case, usually called 
"industrial policy", this was part of an extensive debate in the last years of the twentieth 
century.  
 
Several specific problems arise in the discussion of industrial policy. On the one hand, 
allocating public resources to strengthen or support private companies (or what is not 
very different, allocating public resources to public enterprises that run in competition 
with the private sector) can distort the operation of the markets. When the focus of 
industrial policy favors certain sectors over others (we have a steel industry, ergo, Paz 
del Río) the decisions of government planners may override those of entrepreneurs who 
have better knowledge of the conditions and prospects markets. This led to some 
countries, like South Korea in the 80s, to replace sector al lines (steel support) by 
functional criteria (support for science and technology in various areas university 
research centers. Another is the problem of the efficiency of positive incentives. The 
state is providing resources to a particular business. What assurance that private 
entrepreneurs have benefited from having made the same activity with their own 
resources even without the state contribution? Finally, industrial policy, when it 
materializes in incentives to big business groups, although objectively have the best 
conditions for achieving the aims of that, can raise concerns of distributive policy. 
However, is it lawful in the exercise of a development policy favoring wealthy 
entrepreneurs in society when there are many low-income workers who have urgent 
needs for survival? Probably the case in countries like South Korea or Taiwan was less 
confrontational than in the Latin American region, because the distribution of income 
there was less unequal than among us. 
  
From a technical perspective, the challenge to "give rules to find the correspondence 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
companies through increased public spending on education and health. It privileges the technical and 
scientific education vii) Agreements between public and private sectors around goals, prices, information, 
etc. viii) basic research funding by the state. ix) Land reform and financing plans for housing for the 
working classes. 
13
 Currie (1978). 
between government revenue directly from the business sector (domestic tax revenue) 
and expenditure that the state directed to this sector, identifying existing expenditure 
items, which are aimed at innovation or development of private enterprises?, identified 
these items Is it possible to decide allocation of industrial or commercial activities” 
raises concerns theoretical, institutional and practical. 
 Let's start with the part of government revenue "directly from the business sector 
(domestic tax revenue)”. It would have at least three income categories: those arising 
from a domestic direct taxes, mainly income and other, those resulting from indirect 
taxation at the national (VAT and customs duties), taxes and regional entities (such as 
ICA and property taxes). In Colombia previously raised the need for reliable 
information on each of these sources of tax revenue, broken down by sector. This is 
because the effective level of taxation in each sector will vary according to their 
characteristics and the nature of their production process. However, in practice they are 
not, although it would be possible and desirable to build the compile DANE.  
 
In theoretical terms should address the following issues: i) the income tax paid by 
companies in different sectors, the information exist in the Directorate of National 
Taxes and Customs, DIAN. However, it is reported due to the reserve that protects 
taxpayers' declarations. For some companies (supervised by the Superintendence of 
Finance and Company) can make indirect estimates. It would be desirable for the DIAN 
give such data, aggregated according to DANE and the community of researchers and 
analysts. ii) On the indirect taxes at the national, orthodox economic theory suggests 
that under competitive conditions they are moved to consumers. However, certain 
special tax treatment (exemption from VAT on low-cost computers or books) may have 
indirect effects on demand and eventually on the performance of the sectors concerned. 
This can be a very fertile field for research. iii) More complex still is the issue of land 
taxes, for problems such as the availability of information, their comparability and the 
sector allocation of the collections. The problem is critical for the discussion of primary 
activities: the agricultural sector, forestry and mining. Again, we are not in the realm of 
impossibility but the DANE and other entities of the National Government would have 
significant work to collect and compile the relevant information, including in many 
cases a great effort technical support to departments and municipalities are the primary 
sources of information.  
 
The expenditure side, the theoretical problems are not minor, and these in turn affect the 
rules to be suggested. As noted elsewhere in this report, the size of state intervention in 
the economy is not a homogeneous cause. Conventionally, the weight-graph is 
intervention in the economy is measured by the consolidated public expenditure share in 
GDP. This indicator in turn has as its starting point the budget approved by Congress, 
departmental assemblies and municipal councils or district. It is the explicit cost (FIG. 
1, p. 27), although for the same reasons of availability of information is not always easy 
to set up the amount that goes to industrial policies. However, this is an incomplete and 
imperfect indicator. And for the reasons explained below, tends to systematically 
underestimate the participation in the mixed economy drive Shonfield state and 
regulatory state, in the terminology used elsewhere in this report. 
  
Other types of state activity that channel resources towards the business sector and can 
have an impact on "innovation and development of private enterprises": i) A tool of 
choice, exemplified in the most recent tax reform is tax expenditures, it is, reductions or 
exemptions from certain taxes (e.g., the deductions for investment in fixed assets) to 
encourage certain business conduct. The tax cost is reflected in lower tax revenues, and 
as such has an impact on the exchequer (finance and business) comparable to that of the 
recurrent expenditure. Sadly, the availability of information about the amount of tax 
expenditures is very poor, both aggregate and sector level. To the best knowledge of 
authors, the issue has not been subject to detailed investigation by the DIAN. And by 
the fund which covers the tax returns, which independent researchers can do is limited. 
ii) For innovation and business development policy is highly relevant for the protection 
of intellectual property. The particular legislation creates a temporary monopoly for the 
benefit of creators and inventors, and this generates revenues paid by users of 
knowledge and encourages innovation. Due to pressure from our trading partners, the 
government has made efforts to strengthen this protection. 
  
But the benefits do not match the majority of national companies, precisely because of 
the limited development of our scientific and technological capacity. One might think 
that this policy is harmful to domestic firms, to the extent that urges their access to 
knowledge and technology generated abroad. In fact, economic history states (in the 
case of intellectual property in the United States during the nineteenth and industrial 
property in East Asia in past decades) that a lax policy (explicit or implicit) on the 
protection of these rights can stimulate the incorporation of technological advances in 
production processes and adaptive innovation firms in developing countries iii) A third 
strategy is the regulation, if that does not generate state spending but does impose 
obligations on regulated to allocate resources to particular activities. Thus, public goals 
are achieved with private funds. The outstanding example, for the amounts involved, is 
the scheme of the Act 100, is aimed at ensuring the pension and health coverage for 
Colombians through entities liable to pay service providers are mostly private. This 
expenditure would not be reflected as "public" in the usual accounts, although in 
practice this is a way to materialize the aims of public policy. In the case of innovation, 
a case in point is the regulation of private higher education, which, through mechanisms 
such as registration and accreditation qualified encourages universities to devote 
resources to research themselves iv) Finally the addressing of public expenditure for 
certain purposes can be an effective tool for industrial policy to promote innovation. 
 The best examples are programs for the purchase of high-tech weapons and space 
research in practice become subsidies for innovation which can then be exploited by 
contractors in commercial markets. However, this policy model is limited to developed 
countries and developing countries of large size, as the PRC. 
In summary, the array of industrial policy is diversified and derails the conventional 
definitions of public spending. Beyond having better information on public expenditure 
it would need specific studies with specific method issues such as tax expenditures, 
protection of intellectual property, regulation and direction of public expenditure 
purchases high technology from national sources. 
 The different approaches recognize that as the market is flawed, so does the state. This 
is to decrease both. 
 
The debate: social choice and public choice. 
 The public choice theory is seeking public organizations and public property as close as 
possible to follow the logic of the market, while social choice (social choice) recognizes 
that the area of the market is limited and therefore not claims that the decision in the 
political sphere, respond to cost-benefit logic (Arrow 1963). 
 Overall Buchanan and Tullock seek to apply to political phenomena, cost / benefit to be 
derived from the economic logic. According to Mueller, "the object of study of public 
choice is the same that of political science: the theory of the state, voting rules, voting 
behavior, party politics, the bureaucracy, etc. As in economic theory the basic postulate 
of public choice behavior are related to be considered a selfish, rational, utility 
maximizing” (Mueller 1979). 
The seminal ideas of public choice theory can be found in Spinoza, Hobbes, Madison 
and Tocqueville. The difference between these thinkers and modern approach is the use 
of economic analysis.  
Buchanan and Tullock, suggests three organizational alternatives. In the first, the 
option, the person believes that it is best not to make agreements with anyone. In the 
second case, option b, the person uses a private association. And in the third alternative 
option c, the person accepts the state actions. The final decision will tend to favor the 
solution that minimizes the costs of social interdependence. Of course, in this scheme 
personal preference is reflected in collective action. There is no rupture between the 
person and collective choices because if there is unanimity or near-unanimity, the 
collective choice adequately express preferences. 
 Buchanan shows that unlike what normally held, employers do not hate the regulation 
or intervention in the economy. On the contrary, love and seek it, because it guarantees 
them monopolies, barriers to entry, finally, elimination of competition. No one denies 
the existence of altruistic motives in the public service or is engaged in an Aristotelian 
conception of politics as a service of good governance: it simply argues that those 
considerations are not significant determinants or act as mitigating factors, given the 
complexity of the tensions of people. 
 It would be wrong to hold in public men a kind of dichotomy between altruistic, which 
would own the policy, and practice of the common man's own selfishness. The right 
thing is to assume that public men also have essentially selfish motives, which 
incidentally explains, such as, the steady increase in government spending, because 
what interests the policy is to maximize its usefulness. Then, the usual strategy to make 
this purpose is an economic policy that favors the redistribution and the deficit, not a 
policy that emphasizes production or fiscal balance. 
 In other words, politicians are due solely to his private interest. With come see this 
recognition and look for institutional mechanisms to find a compatibility between this 
recognition and the principles of democracy
14
. An author like De Jasay (1993) puts it 
this way: “the State in principle aims to meet the interests of citizens, because its main 
purpose is to reproduce itself and increase its power. This buys into the cities through 
public spending”. 
  
The social choice theory has its origins in Locke, Rousseau, Borda or Condorcet. It 
highlights the difficulties in constructing the consensus from the aggregation of each 
will or social contract (Rousseau), voting rules (Borda and Condorcet).  
The impossibility of constructing a social welfare function (Arrow 1951) Sen 1970) that 
show each preference, the many explicit restrictions of majority rule in democratic 
societies. The great weakness of majority rule, Arrow says, is that it can lead to 
situations profoundly unfair. Under the impossibility theorem, the social choice theory 
does not admit that there is a linear sequence between personal choice and collective 
choice. The two are in conflict permanently because the individual's interests are not 
reflected in the collective decision. 
  
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) consider that it is legitimate and necessary to extend the 
notion of market efficiency to the political sphere. Arrow (1951, 1963), however, 
restrict the notion of efficiency to real commercial relations. Arrow to market efficiency 
is not valid in the field of politics, which is the same as the collective choice. The 
injustice of democracy is not the market corrects. 
  
After the Arrow, the author more representative Amartya K. Sen, who has made an 
enormous analytical effort to overcome the "impossibility" posed by Arrow. His social 
decision function can be advanced on the social welfare function of Arrow, but as 
                                                             
14 In an interview during a visit to Argentina, Buchanan put it clearly: "The focus of our approach is that 
politicians and bureaucrats behave essentially like everyone else. Everyone responds to incentives: the 
main political interest is being elected again and again, for that very reason is that politicians generally 
want to move up the bureaucratic pyramid, and for larger budgets. What I'm trying to say is that 
politicians respond only to their particular interest. This behavior coincides perfectly with the economic 
model of behavior. It is perhaps this very good explanation of how politics works, but usually not taken 
into account by those who study political science” (Buchanan, www.eneasbiglione.com.ar/articles/5.html) 
acknowledged by Sen (1970 b)
15
, this path requires giving up the "dictatorship" of 
complete systems
16
. 
  
Public choice is rooted in conventional notions of rationality and efficiency, which are 
hardly compatible with increasing returns and endogenous dynamics generated by the 
processes of concentration. It is easier to reach unanimity as the rule more precise. 
Buchanan and Tullock criticize him Arrow (1951, 1963) its want to seek a social 
welfare function, because they believe that this ambitious aim precludes agreement 
between people. That is, the commitments fall on ground rules. The search for basic 
rules placed in the background questions consequentiality nature, the type of society 
they want. Therefore, the distributional analysis is more covered by the definition of the 
social welfare function in the setting of minimal norm. In Colombia, public choice 
theory, inspired by Buchanan and Tullock, has emphasized more the definition of the 
rule that the target distribution. 
 
The state in Colombia  
The conception of the state in Colombia has changed throughout history. In the reform 
of 1936 gave powers to the state to intervene in the economy through rationalization of 
production, distribution and consumption as well as the protection of workers according 
to their acquired rights. In the late fifties established the National Council on Economic 
Policy and Planning, the Administrative Department of Planning and Technical 
Services, which are entities in charge of recommending lines of economic policy. Then, 
in 1968 with the administrative reform Lleras, the structures were changed by the 
Council and the above mentioned entities became the National Economic and Social 
Policy (Conpes), and the National Planning Department (DNP), respectively . In the 
seventies are consolidated development plans, but since the second half of the eighties 
the real sector planning is losing importance, and development plans become budget 
management programs, without vision of the medium and long-term. Despite its 
principles, the National Planning Department, DNP, it loses its long-term goals and 
becomes an entity that regulates short-term investments.  
Between 1970 and 1974 launched the Four Strategic Plan, whose central point was the 
need to boost the sectors 'leaders', construction and exports, pointing as complementary 
                                                             
15 Sen 1970. 
16 Nevertheless, the collective choice will always have problems. In the reading of receiving the Nobel 
Prize, says Sen, "'A camel, has said, is a horse designed by a committee”. This seems a telling example of 
the appalling shortcomings of the decisions made by committees, but it is actually too light as an 
accusation. A camel may not be as fast as a horse, but is nevertheless a very useful animal, harmonious, 
well suited to travel long distances without food or water. When designing a horse, a committee that tries 
to accommodate the diverse desires of its members may well end up with something much less consistent, 
perhaps a centaur in Greek mythology, half horse and half something else a creation that combines the 
wild volatility and I confused "(Sen 1998 b, p. 178). 
strategies to increase agricultural productivity and improving income distribution . Later 
in the period 1975-1978 was submitted to Congress on Plan to Close the Gap, whose 
main idea was to raise the standard of living of the population most vulnerable, 
particularly rural, to stabilize the economy and the elimination of indiscriminate 
subsidies were granted to various productive sectors. In 1979 he launched the National 
Integration Plan (PIN), which focused their interest in infrastructure sectors (energy, 
mining, transportation and media) and to grant greater autonomy to the regions. Then, 
in the period 1983-1986 was presented with Equity Plan Change, seeking short-term 
aim of economic recovery, with a renewed emphasis on public housing policy, and 
suggested a set of policies for medium and long-term straightened to make sure growth 
of industry and agriculture. 
  
In the early seventies began to question the first time the efficiency of government 
machinery that had been created for nearly half a century to postulate the need to 
disassemble part of the interventionist state. However, this view is usually decried as 
"neoliberal" responded to a new wave of international thinking, but is reflected on a 
limited basis in Colombia. The term neoliberal is not suitable because it ignores the 
potential that classical liberalism is to build a society with high social content.  
 
During the government of Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1974-1978), was given a new 
impetus to social programs to the law of nationalization of education, the Food and 
Nutrition Program (PAN) and the Integrated Rural Development (DRI). Mining policy 
was modified by removing the colonial system of "concessions" and replaced by 
"partnership contracts" between state enterprises and foreign firms. During the 
administration Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), state investment in infrastructure became the 
center of the development plan. Finally, during the government of Belisario Betancur 
(1982-1986), was launched the popular home plan more ambitious in the history of the 
country and began to bear fruit mining policies adopted since 1974. During the Barco 
administration (1986-1990) put emphasis on the social, particularly in what was called 
the elimination of absolute poverty. Barco began the process of gradually opening. 
Subsequently, the Gaviria administration (1990-1994) the modernization of the state 
was a priority. The Minister of Finance, Rudolf Hommes, emphasizes the openness of 
the economy, put first the fight against inflation and sought to cut the size of the state 
(Estrada 2006)
17
. 
  
The Samper administration (1994-1998) called the Salto Social development plan which 
sought to do growth rates that allow car tie-poverty of millions of Colombians. It is, 
then, to "build a new economic and productive citizen”. In this case, the government 
aims to correct structural imbalances in the current account which had caused the 
opening, and the revaluation of the peso, but the scope of action of the economic 
                                                             
17 Perry, Lora Rodríguez (1992). 
authorities declined considerably with the so-called "trial 8000”.  
With Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) arrived “Change to Build Peace”. The Colombian 
economic crisis of 1999 (the worst since the Great Depression) was the result of 
structural problems that began in 1991 and which were not resolved during the Samper 
administration. Pastrana bet a negotiation with armed groups, the FARC. Uribe's 
government (2002 - 2008) has put the emphasis on achieving greater security, as a 
condition for achieving a prosperous economy and modern. This is the purpose of the 
so-called democratic security
18
. 
  
Over time, the regulatory role of the state has gained importance. In Colombia this work 
is done in very different ways. The legislative and administrative changes are very 
important. Institutional expressions of this state function are, among others, the central 
bank, public utility regulatory commissions, the National Television Commission, the 
National Civil Service Commission, the Superintendent
19
. In short, these new forms of 
state action have consolidated, especially since the nineties. It is increasingly clear that 
the separation between state and market is false
20
. 
                                                             
18 "The Uribe government came with the conviction of the need to introduce major changes related to the 
uncontrolled growth of public expenditures, the uncertainty expressed in violence, drug trafficking and 
the sharpening of social conflict ... The plan also includes the current government to achieve growth 
economic development and employment generation. The Community state must distribute economic 
growth between different social groups, regions, rural and city and the various genres. The promise of 
renewal of the State includes a thorough administrative restructuring through liquidation or merger of 
institutions, streamlining the size of government "(President of the Republic, DNP 2002). 
19 Art. 66 of Act 489 of 1998 establishes the superintendence and agencies established by law and that, 
within the limits of administrative and financial autonomy that it had told them met the inspection and 
monitoring functions conferred by law or by delegation to President of the Republic. The superintendents 
are: i) Notary and Registration - Ministry of Interior and Justice - (Decree 302 of 2004). ii) Banking - 
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit - (Decree 663 of 1993, arts. 325 et seq., Act 510 of 1999 and 
Decrees 2489 1999 2002 1577 206 2004). iii) Values - Ministry of Finance and Public Credit - (203 
decreto. 2004) iv) Child benefits - Ministry of Social Protection - (Decree 2150 of 1992). v) National 
Health - Ministry of Social Protection (Decree 1259 of 1994) vi) Industry and Trade - Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Tourism (Decree 2153 of 1992). vii) Partnerships - Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism 
- (Decree 1080 of 1996). viii) Port and Transport - Ministry of Transport - (Decree 101 of 2000, arts. 40 
et seq., 2000 and 1016). ix) Monitoring and Private Security - Ministry of National Defense - (2453 
Norm. 1993). x) Public Utilities - Ministry of Environment, Housing and Territorial Development - 
(Decree 548 of 1995 and 990 2002). xi) Solidarity Economy - Ministry of Finance and Public Credit - 
(Act 454 of 1998, Art. 33 et seq., and decree. 186, 2004). 
20 "The state is the mechanism par excellence that have developed modern societies  found the right 
balance between market and society, between private interest and collective interest: to help build 
capacity, security and access to power for all members society, on the one hand, and to ensure an 
environment in which markets are functioning properly, on the other. But it is obviously the only 
instrument. There are other institutions, from the family to the many civil society organizations, relief 
workers in these areas. Understanding this is more important as we understand today, much better than 
before, and there are "market failures" (the risk of exclusion or failure of the market alone to generate the 
contexts in which they develop properly), there also bulging "government failures" bureaucratic 
rationality and patronage in the functioning of state institutions, problems of representation, 
predominance in the operation of state institutions of the dominant economic interests, opportunities 
created by government intervention for the rent seekers and information problems that affect government 
actions " (Ocampo 2001, p. 39). 
  
After Gaviria governments have yielded to the temptation to confuse the functions of 
state government, with the aim of promoting structural reforms have been inadequate 
for their weak links with specific regions and departments. However, the evolution of 
Colombian institutions have responded to short-term cyclical references that a 
conception of the state in the long-term. In others words, there has been no unified 
concept of reform. The institutional framework has not been consolidated
21
. 
 In Colombia, political and social conflict has lived with medium development levels, 
with relative macroeconomic stability, and a flawed but enduring democratic system 
(Gómez 1999). The precariousness of the state is reflected in its inability to cut land 
conflicts, the guerrilla warfare and the imposition of drug trafficking. The 
decentralization of political power was losing ground to the ability of some mafia 
groups that "did state at local level" (Estrada, 2007). Institutional stability in the regions 
over the coming years will depend on the ability of the state to recover the balance of 
local authorities in the townships and rural areas (Catatumbo, Putumayo, and 
Buenaventura). 
Be premature to say that the Colombian state has lost territory, although there is a clear 
conflict in different regions of political geography. Between 1988 and 2005 has a high 
homicide rate and ma-sacral. State representatives at the local level (police, mayors, 
governors, prosecutors) abandoned their commitments, or were outmanned by the 
threats and intimidation by agents of violence. The scandal of the "politics paramilitary" 
permeates social life more personal collaboration of some citizens in the conflict. The 
dynamics of the massacres was reproduced in ascending order. And while the country 
maintained reasonable growth rates, expanding the logic of self-defense groups created 
a territorial and strategic corridor that divided geographically north of the center of the 
country. A formal command economy entered into competition with informal forms of 
derivatives of coca production between Urabá, Cauca, Sur de Bolivar and Catatumbo. 
This fact makes this that the state represented fragmented drive permanently in locations 
exposed to risk of a faille’s state. 
 Throughout the twentieth century the Colombian state has adapted to the needs 
imposed by economic conditions. In addition to internal processes, the international 
momentum has influenced the definition of the type of state. During the nineteenth 
century different emphases can be seen in relation to the state and the economy: from 
the traditional role of Spanish Patrimonial State, through a policy of building up the 
defense of a classical liberal conception
22
. In the first two decades of the twentieth 
                                                             
21 "... reforms increase rather than decrease the macroeconomic vulnerability and introduced additional 
elements of political instability" (Wiesner 2004). 
22 "... the prevailing model in the nineteenth century Colombian constitutionalism is characterized by a 
remarkable economic liberalism, the orders set out the main bourgeois freedoms: the right to property, 
freedom and enterprise (or liberty of industry and commerce ... which also includes the freedom of choice 
and exercise of profession or trade), whose regulation is entrusted to private law" (It-Trade 2002, p. 181). 
century, the Colombian State is consistent with the classical conception of the rule of 
law. In the next decade the government began to play a more active role in economic 
management. In this transformation were decisive experiences of the Mexican 
Revolution and the New Deal in the United States of America. Completing the century, 
again giving the market a greater role in allocating resources, following a line similar to 
the one presented in the United States, England and multilateral institutions like the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund or Inter-American Development Bank. 
Negatively, this trend contrasts with many provisions of the Constitution of 1991 in that 
there is an abundance of articles about the regulation of the economy. The constitutional 
text does not express a single type of state. Monetary policy and the independence of 
the Bank of the Republic serve an unorthodox scheme, minimalist. But the functions for 
the Rule of Law, are more heterodox, and need direct interventions and lead to increases 
in public spending. 
With these principles, economic policy should give to the satisfaction of economic, 
social and cultural rights. Economic freedom and private initiative must be compatible 
with the common good, the environment and cultural heritage of the nation. The general 
direction of the economy is charged to the State, which must intervene to improve the 
quality of life of people, equity in the distribution of opportunities and the preservation 
of healthy environment. There is an obvious mismatch between the 1991 Constitutional 
effects, marked by a kind of social rule of law, the fiscal need of a minimal state 
(Wiesner 2004). In other words, we see a discontinuity between the changes proposed 
by the Constitution of 91 in terms of a social state of law, and the precarious 
institutional evolution. There is a tension between the conservative spirit that animates 
bodies such as the Bank of the Republic, and the wide possibilities that allows social 
supervisory action. 
Specifically, the 1991 Constitution was inspired by some aspects of the Rawlsian 
conception of justice as fairness (Rawls 1971). And in this case, a refund of social rights 
by passing obligatorily reconstructs the redistributive mechanisms of the economy. 
However, the inspiration Rawls demanded a reality for the Colombian case was distant, 
as the criteria of equality and liberty only under conditions of materiality are different 
opportunities, capacities and incentives (Sen 1985). 
In examining the characteristics of the Colombian state must take into account also the 
heterogeneity of the country. This is a regional political geography and relatively 
complex when compared with other Latin American countries. This has had a profound 
impact on national economic and political development. This configuration has mixed 
effect on the violence
23
. In terms of policies of state regional heterogeneity has 
fragmented the efforts of the economy to overcome what Nieto (1971) termed as "a 
country with an economy of the archipelago." One of the most perverse effects of 
regional heterogeneity is the absence of a consolidated internal market. Moreover, this 
regional heterogeneous condition had a decisive effect on the process of 
                                                             
23 Gallup, Gaviria y Lora (2003,) Montenegro (2006). 
deindustrialization (Echavarria, Villamizar, 2007) as the main regions of the country 
were integrated only through modern communications in late. Colombia is moving very 
slowly towards the consolidation of the domestic market. 
 
Data & Statistics  
 
It has linked this with the data presented by DANE on revenue, expenditure and public 
sector production. Trends of the series can be derived the following general 
conclusions: i) State participation in GDP has grown. ii) The weight of monetary policy 
has increased. iii) The expenditure has been slowly piecing a police state and weakly 
favorable to welfare iv) Public policy has chosen to redistribute wealth by way of 
expenditure and not income. v) The state makes efforts to focus resources, to water 
down the decentralization process. 
With the information available from DANE is not possible to check this process, such 
as: i) Increasing regulatory function of the state ii) The political fragmentation, and the 
progress of the structure to-state. iii) The internal changes of monetary policy.  
These comments relate to the core national accounts series. Indeed, existing information 
on the DANE can set up many relationships that help to understand the dynamics of the 
state. From household surveys is possible, such as, obtaining a figure of the number of 
public employees. However this is the result of a sample and as such is not relevant to 
know the absolute value of employment, although it can be very useful to know what 
the relative weight of public procurement has in total employment. As above, the 
DANE statistics also allow make considerations about the impact of taxes on the 
structure of household consumption. But again, these results are indirect. 
 
State participation in the economy has grown 
 
 
 
FIG. 1 
 
 
State participation in the economy has grown
24
. In Colombia we see an increase in state 
participation in the GDP. Wagner (1883, 1892) into law proposes the following 
                                                             
24 "Government expenditures, which are a good reflection of the size of government, are at the highest 
level of the century (21% of GDP). The average between 1905 and 1960 was 5% of GDP, and between 
1960 and 1990 was 9%. The growth in participation was related to the transfers to the regions and in 
some cases, large investments in infrastructure (transport, energy and mining). Between 1990 and 2003 its 
share in GDP has increased, which is mainly explained by the behavior of the transfers (land, pensions 
and other) and interest on debt. It is stressed that budget reforms have not had the expected success, in 
principle: public expenditure as a percentage of GDP always increases. This trend is 
very clear on the Colombian series (Figure 1). Public spending grew
25
. The result is 
very interesting because the continuity of the series contrasts with the diversity of 
policies that have tried to make in Colombia. The policy proposals are different and 
governments, however, public spending goes up. In the long period from 1950 to 2002, 
government guidance and has been mixed, however, spending grows.  
This finding does not mean that government policies have been homogeneous. They 
were very dissimilar. And an example of this is how evolved the deficit and, above all, 
the way they funded. Fiscal policy is interesting, says Blinder and Solow (1974) 
because the deficit funding arrangements have important implications on debt and 
macro interactions. Since the fifties the instruments of fiscal policy have been very 
heterogeneous, and this has resulted in substantive changes in the size of the deficit and 
the public debt management. 
 
 
 
TAB. 1 
 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes the major components of income and expenditure of the 
nonfinancial public sector. The series is not strictly comparable with that of Figure 1 
because the estimation methodologies are different. That is, the series confirms the 
increase in expenditure and also allows him to watch fiscal imbalance.  
In the fifties and sixties believed in state intervention and medium-term planning. The 
governments of Lleras (1966-1970) modernizing the state apparatus. 1968 
Administrative decentralization is still relevant today. Despite the changes brought 
about by regional decentralization, the basic scaffolding of the constitutional reform of 
1968 still stands. Then, the Pastrana administration (1970-1974) was a step backwards 
in terms of agrarian reform. The Pact Chicoral (1971) ended any hope of land 
distribution in the country. But The Four Strategies, the development plan incorporates 
elements Keynesian Pastrana, some leading sectors (mainly construction)
26
. López 
(1974-1978) is to liberalize the economy, and over the years public spending falls. 
Turbay (1978-1982) incorporates elements Keynesians. Subsequently, the National 
Integration Plan (DNP 1979) seeks to develop energy infrastructure and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
terms of flexibility and reduce public expenditure in Colombia (Junguito and Rincon 2007). See also 
Junguito and Rincon (2007 b). 
25 The graph presents data for the Central Government. DANE accounting difference between: Central 
Government, Public Administration and Public Sector. 
26 During this regime is significantly influenced by Currie (1978, 1992). 
communications. In short, since the late seventies governments in Colombia and the 
world, begin to suspect the benefits of state action.  
 
The 1991 Constitution seeks to strengthen the Rule of Law in a secular context. The 
modernization of the state proposed by the Constitution emphasizes inclusive measures. 
While Gaviria (1990-1994) and Finance Minister Rudolf Hommes, looking for 
incentives to market, the 1991 Constitution reaffirmed the desirability of government 
intervention. In turn, the constituents claim that proper money management an 
independent central bank is consistent with the expansionary policies that are usually 
necessary to make sure the strengthening of the Rule of Law. Clearly, the government 
and technocrats offered a normative model seeking efficiency and passing by a decrease 
in size of government. In reality did not happen, and public spending continued to 
grow
27
. The tight monetary policy encouraged increased interest rates, the dollar inflows 
and revaluation of the peso. This was reflected in significant growth in imports. Samper 
(1994-1998) seeks to correct the huge trade deficit and stem the flow of dollars, but the 
process 8000 he reduced the margin for maneuver and did not take radical measures 
were necessary to reorient the economy. The two governments Uribe (2002 - 2006: 
2006 - 2010) have been lax in the monetary field, without this has been reflected in high 
inflation. Otherwise, the expansion of means of payment has not translated into higher 
prices. This Keynesian spirit has kept pace with increased public spending co.  
 
It's rather complex to say with certainty that the changes brought by the opening of the 
nineties represented progress and that the deviations of the Colombian state were caused 
by the incompleteness of the reforms introduced by the market (Hommes 1998). 
Hommes and Gaviria are part of a broader theoretical current that seeks to dispense with 
the State in all those activities in which the market may be present. Therefore, the idea 
is that governments are unable to adopt the right policies for development and economic 
growth. The fundamental arsenal to sustain this program is the theories of rational 
choice, methodological individualism and equilibrium analysis
28
. The fanaticism with 
which it fought against the state Gaviria forced to recognize that the reforms had been 
"oversold”. 
On the other hand, international analysts share the premise retrospective Colombian 
economic development is its long-term macroeconomic stability. "Colombia has 
                                                             
27 Wiesner attributes the increased spending in the 1991 The Constitution of 1991 raised the total public 
spending to unsustainable levels causing serious fiscal problems that have not been is corrected and two 
in its structural roots. The big limitation of this correction has been insufficient political support to protect 
the country's macroeconomic stability and political heritage of it as a "common" to all citizens. This 
situation has been aggravated by recent rulings by the Constitutional Court to interfere with the laws of 
fiscal adjustment. Within this context, the independence of the Central Bank has been a breakthrough of 
enormous benefit to the institutional development of the macroeconomic framework in general "(Wiesner 
2004). 
28 Colclough y Manor (1994). 
enjoyed extremely cautious macroeconomic policies" (Robinson 2007). While Latin 
America in general is irregular in macroeconomic management, the exception is filed by 
a "prudent fiscal policy to the extreme." In terms of Ocampo (2004): "The tendency to 
be on the average is also a feature that is repeated when examining other economic and 
social indicators”. It is interesting to check how macroeconomic management has been 
consistent with systematic growth of state intervention. 
The relevant point is that despite the diversity of economic policies, public spending 
continues to move upwards again. It seems as if the heterogeneity of the policies did not 
have enough strength to influence the evolution of expenditure. In short, the expenditure 
share of GDP is insensitive to changes in the orientation of public policy. This 
observation raises significant interpretive challenges. 
  
Yet ironically, the functioning of markets shows that the intervention of the state has 
been necessary. The industrialization process would not have been consolidated without 
state intervention, either to protect, subsidize, or serving as an entrepreneur. Hodgson's 
phrase (1999, p. 82) is very telling: "... still under the supposed model of free market in 
the United States economy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was a 
systematic state intervention”. 
  
State intervention remains very important, although the modalities of regulation are 
different. The state has withdrawn from areas previously controlled. Moreover, this 
transformation is the result of the way capitalism has been transformed, no longer can 
be contained in the logic of the nation-state. Faced with the transformations of 
contemporary capitalism - see globalization - the national framework is too narrow
29
.  
In the strongest Asian economies is undeniable that their successful development has 
been directed by the state. Looking at the participation that is public expenditure in 
GDP of the countries of Western Europe, Canada, New Zealand or the United States, 
there is no reason to believe that the state and specific social training has been cornered, 
and remains the principal actor in international relations, including economic
30
. 
                                                             
29 "The state control over space and time are increasingly outweighed by the global flows of capital, 
goods, services, technology, communication, and power. The capture by the state of historical time 
through their ownership of the tradition and the (re) construction of national identity is challenged by 
plural identities defined by autonomous subjects. The State's attempt to reassert its power in the 
developing global supranational institutions further undermines its sovereignty, and its effort to restore 
the legitimacy decentralizing regional and local administrative power strengthens the centrifugal 
tendencies, to bring citizens to the government but increase its distrust of the nation-state. Thus, while 
global capitalism thrives and nationalist ideologies operate throughout the world, the nation-state, as 
established in the early modern history, seems to be losing its power, though, and this is essential no 
influence " (Castells 2000, p. 72). 
30 "... if in addition to the relationship between multinational enterprises and the state, including the wide 
range of policies through which nation states can use their regulatory powers to facilitate or block the 
movement of capital, labor, information and goods, it is clear that at this point in history, the vanishing of 
the nation state is a fallacy "(Castells 2000, p. 72). 
 FIG. 2 
 
 
The growth of the state also can be seen from the perspective of public employment. 
Vatter and Walker (1986) think that Wagner's law can also look in the light of the 
evolution of public employment. The evolution of public employment is presented in 
Figure 2 and Table 2
31
. The series was published by the Commission for the 
Rationalization of Public Expenditure (1997). As explained in the report, the Committee 
had great difficulty in gathering relevant information. The study recommends that the 
DANE statistics return to your employment and public wages. Despite the slowdown in 
growth, the trend is positive. As the Commission noted the number does not include 
employment outside the plant that it has increased significantly. 
 
 
TAB. 2 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 3 
 
 
The composition of the plant has changed much. The lower use of certain entities has 
been offset by increased hiring in the areas of justice and defense. 
The increase in the number of public employees is absolute and contrasts with its 
relative importance (Figure 3). Between 1976 and 1995 the share of public employment 
in the total rose from 9.3% to 7.6%. This ratio is very low compared with other 
countries. In France, such as, almost one-third of the jobs are public. 
Theories of public finance have played a very different way the presence of the Wagner 
Act. 
 
The first reason behind the growing trend of public spending is the progressive demands 
of society. In many social services are increasing small costs. The most obvious is 
health care. The small cost is growing as life expectancy increases. The marginal cost to 
advance exponentially. Moving from 75 years to 76 has a marginal cost much more than 
                                                             
31 Data are payroll employees. 
going from 30 to 40 years. If the demands of population increase, public spending 
grows. 
The second explanation is related to the greater complexity of markets and social 
interactions. Indeed, new forms of regulation are reflected in increased social spending. 
The modes of intervention have diversified much in the last 20 years. The 
heterogeneities are notorious. Mention a few. The forms of interaction have changed 
substantially. The styles of grant, such as, are becoming more disparate, covering 
diverse sectors. They have signed concessions in airports, education, roads, 
transportation, TV, telecommunications, etc. And besides, have created new laws 
requiring that private resources allocated to specific purposes. The most significant has 
been the financing of health and social security. The resources administered by the 
private sector are important. Pension funds are managing $ 50 billion. This amount of 
savings has relevant macroeconomic implications. The financial savings can be used to 
finance productive activities, or simply to feed the bubble. In practice the latter path has 
prevailed. 
These transactions constitute fiscal policy in the sense defined by Blinder and Solow 
(1974). For these authors, fiscal policy is important because of its impact on public debt. 
Not because of its amount. Accordingly, transactions that are done with the pension 
savings affect the structure of capital market and therefore how you set the terms for the 
debt. Pension funds are institutional holders of the TES that are major players in the 
market. Moreover, the interactions that start with the legal need to transfer to private 
entities for the payment of social security, and ending with the financial investments are 
complex and erratic. It is then possible to define causal relationships that are direct and 
linear. 
This conclusion has three substantive implications. On the one hand, questions the 
effectiveness of an intervention focused on fine tuning. In addition, the multi-causality 
shows the impossibility of fixing unidirectional linear sequences. And finally, the 
information provided by DANE in Colombia is insufficient to continue in this direction. 
Specifically, payroll taxes are also a form of transfer required by law. These provisions 
may lead to private (Compensation Fund), manage resources that will reach them by 
private, but by laws and regulations. These types of government intervention are 
illustrative only, but they prove the heterogeneous nature of the action of the State in 
Colombia. In some cases, local governments have reached to give the private tax 
collection.  
Contemporary societies have come to accept, in fact, that the market has inherent 
limitations. And therefore, government involvement is necessary. The regulatory 
commissions fulfill these oversight functions on market processes. The market can not 
resolve substantive issues such as efficiency and equity. These dimensions are not 
converging through market dynamics. The regulatory state has the force without any 
disassembly of the interventionist state. Both coexist. In fact, they have always lived. 
The bottom line indicates that the state's participation is increased substantively. Not 
only for the public expenditure side, but also because the regulatory functions have 
expanded considerably. 
Wagner's law also explains why people prefer present to future well-being. This 
principle is expressed forcefully Böhm-Bawerk (1895). For reasons which the author 
associated with the human condition, the preference for present satisfaction pressing 
public spending increases. In the literature speaks of populism fiscal Keynesian. 
Governments are often tempted to offer goods and services or to issue currency, to gain 
popularity or extend its mandate. In this sense, end up playing the game to the interests 
of the governed. 
 
The weight of the monetary policy has increased 
Financial globalization and trade in services and trade contemporaries have led to new 
forms of government intervention. Although the series of DANE shed no intrinsic 
changes of monetary policy, it is can be done to look at the trends of public credit. That 
is, the characteristics of monetary policy can be analyzed with information from Central 
Bank. With DANE data can be known is the relative weight of public debt. In 
particular, this information is important to know the structure of spending. 
 
An unfavorable welfare state 
In González (2006) argues that Colombia was not enough to build a welfare economics 
and has also failed to structure an economy of warfare. The Uribe administration has 
driven the war machine, but the national economy is far from being classified as a war 
economy (Table 3) 
 
 
TAB. 3 
 
 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of consolidated public sector expenditure by 
purpose-made. Between 1997 and 2004 defense spending goes from 1.93% to 2.53% of 
GDP. Meanwhile, spending on education rose from 3.84% to 5.49% of GDP. In health 
increased from 2.80% to 3.65%. And social security and help goes from 6.83% to 
7.56%. These trends show that defense spending is not very high, and that its growth 
has been very rapid. In 2001 there was a slight substitution between defense spending 
and education. The first grows and the second decreases. It appears that from 2005 
defense spending has continued to increase (Isaza and Campos 2007). 
  
TAB. 4 
 
Please note that the data do not exist in order DANE. DANE should take up this task 
and regain the series ends. González shows that in the United States introduced the 
category "war Keynesian", to make explicit the impact of the finance (income and 
expenditure) of the war in economic activity (2006). In addition, the United States 
during World War II, between 1939 and 1944, the share of public employment in total 
employment rose from 16% to 35%. And defense spending to GDP rose from 2% to 
44% (Stiglitz 2000, pp. 30 and 40). In Colombia we have no welfare economics, or 
economy of warfare. Neither alternative has been consolidated. 
 In 2004 the priorities were as follows: public debt service (10.8% of GDP)
32
, security 
and social assistance (7.56%), education (5.49%), economic services (4.52%), public 
services ( 4.05%), health (3.65), defense (2.53%), public order, security and justice 
(1.95%), housing and urban (0.49%), other social services (0.43%). If you add defense, 
public order, security and justice, the percentage is 4.58%. According to Isaza and 
Campos currently military spending ($ 22.2 billion) representing 6.5% of GDP
33
 Also, 
the defense and security spending began to increase in the second half of the eighties, 
when it escalated the war on drugs. However, it was also from the nineties when the 
broader struggle against various manifestations of violence was reflected in an up spiral 
of spending (Isaza, Campos 2006). 
The importance of social protection must be viewed in a more global perspective. In 
contemporary societies has had a long way through problems that involves government 
expenditure, privatization, joint participation, nationalization or failures and market 
information. Health care absorbs an increasing share of public spending. And why are 
increasing the risks of social protection system reaches a critical state (Fitoussi 1995).  
The weakness of the welfare state in Colombia is expressed in a high poverty. The 
CEPAL report of 2004 stated that despite all the efforts made in the region to reduce 
poverty, the results are uncertain. Consequently, social failure was accompanied by 
great success in growth and control inflation. This means that economic growth does 
not automatically guarantee the reduction of poverty. By contrast, the report stresses 
that high rates of poverty and inequality are an obstacle to growth.  
 
 
                                                             
32 The debt has continued to grow. In 2004 the public debt service reached $ 11 billion. Now exceeds $ 16 
billions. 
33 In the U.S., military spending amounts to 4.04% of GDP, and in European countries that are part of the 
Nato to 2% (Isaza and Fields 2007, p. 4). 
For Tilly the picture is intrinsically dramatic: 
 
In the presence of effective governance, health policies involve, as usual, exploitation 
and opportunity hoarding. As generations of anarchists and libertarians as reviled, it is 
easy to see the exploitation aspect do governments. The ruling classes used the means 
and resources controlled by the government to extract a surplus of tax efforts of citizens 
categorically excluded, and direct at least part of it to activities that people do not 
benefit, but if the ruling classes . Taxes and conscription represent two obvious ways of 
extraction and the wars and the promotion of business of the two forms notorious rulers 
of misuse of resources. The big question is not whether there ex-exploitation, but who 
are part of the ruling class, and how these have the added value: in their own private 
companies, in their material comforts in the war, public goods "(Tilly 2000). 
This quote highlights the problems of distribution and equity when resources are scarce. 
It is usual that the principles are invoked to prove the decisions. 
The transformations have been clearer in recent years. The avail-able series of 
expenditure by purpose (1970-1994) no significant changes (Table 5): 
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FIG. 4 
 
As shown in Figure 3, expenditure on education seems was left address health and 
social security. The dynamics of economic services is very erratic. Also, the growth of 
spending on health and social security is closely related to the law 100 of 1993, which 
forced to increase contributions and gave the administration a significant part of these 
resources to the insurance companies. 
The reconstruction of the state also can be seen on the side of employment. Compare, in 
1995 the use of the central level of the national order accounted for 36.4% of total 
public sector employment and 36.1% of wage costs. Table 7 includes all entities of the 
national central level. 
 
 
 
TAB. 7 
Tables 7, 8 and 9 show an increase in concentration of employment in a few entities. 
Table 9 double encapsulates entities own 90% of employment (Expenditure 
Rationalization Committee 1997). In 1995, teachers, military, police, judiciary and the 
Attorney General's Office more than 90% of employment included in Table 9, which is 
equal to 57.35% of total public sector employment. In short, this concentration process 
was caused by rapid growth of the armed forces (military and police) and an increase of 
officials of the institutions responsible for justice. 
 
 
TAB. 8 
 
 
According to the results of the study of Isaza and Campos (2007, p. 6) the number of 
troops in 2007 was 209,741 (5 troops per 1,000 inhabitants). In 2006 was 196,492 (4.9 
per 1,000) in 2002 was 160,000 (3.8 per 1,000) in 1994 was 120,650 (3.4 per 1,000). 
The growth rate of foot force has been significant. 
 
 
TAB. 9 
 
 
The dynamics of spending and employment growth shows that most have occurred in 
the debt servicing and military spending. 
 
Distribution by the side of expenditure 
 
 
FIG. 5 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the dynamics that have had tax revenues of the Nation, the central level.  
b) Junguito and Rincon (2007) show that in recent years the tax burden of the 
Government reaches the highest level for a century (14% of GDP), after having 
presented averages of 4% of GDP between 1905 and 1949 and 6% of GDP between 
1950 and 1984. Colombia raises little, if her income tax rates compare with the 
international basic (Ocampo 2007). 
  
FIG. 6 
 
 
Colombian tax policy has preferred to distribute by way of spending and not by way of 
taxes. Public spending has an impact on inequality 5 times more than the taxes. One 
explanation for the low capacity distributive taxes may be the remnant of direct taxation 
versus indirect evolution (figure 6) /. Over time the tribe has become increasingly 
important, and this has clear implications for redistribution. That is, taxes on income 
have been very little progress. They have a weak progressivity. And indirect taxes tend 
to be flat. These features of the tax system show that Colombian society has given up 
the task distributive side of taxes and opted rather for public expenditure (education, 
health, subsidies, etc.). The latter decision has less political costs. 
The tax has been more dynamic VAT, which was created with the 1983 reform to 
replace the outdated sales tax. With this tax burden of fiscal control measures 
implemented to trade lower. Their basic fare rose from 10% set in 1983 and running 
until 1990, to 14% in 1993 and 16% in the 1995 tax reform - which, with a temporary 
reduction in 1999, still stands to this day (Table 10). 
The income tax has been relatively timid. In the first decade of this century it reached a 
rate of 37.5% with the 2003 reform, and then decreased until reaching 33%. But at the 
same time, fiscal policy was full of new beneficiaries, with tax breaks in affluent sectors 
of the economy. Table 10 summarizes the key tax rules that have been issued in the 
history of Colombia. 
 
 
TAB. 10 
 
 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, information from regional accounts 
and departmental very limited. The lack of information reflects a state with weak links 
between the central and regional. This unusual combination created imbalances in the 
tax structure impact. Then in the second half of the twentieth century was identified 
serious problems in the periphery and a weak central state. From the economic point of 
view this kind of state was far from the economic ideals touted by the Physiocrats, with 
a regional restructuring arising from deep social conflicts.  
In the first half of the century, the State does not have enough tax instruments, and also 
is exposed to a weak regional and territorial control. But also, the state struggle to 
correct the best way possible, the adjustment required breaks and recession caused by 
the Second World War. We do not count in the first half of the twentieth century with a 
Hobbesian state conditions, conflicts and wars absolute. Neither a state that was faithful 
to the commercial ideas. The regional tax (departments and municipalities) lost 
significance in an accelerated way within the country's total tax. Between 1930 and 
2000 its share fell from 45% to about 20%. 
  
After eighty Colombia have had fourteen important tax reforms, two of them in the 
eighties (1983 and 1986), eight in the nineties (two in 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 
two in 1998) and four in the new millennium (2000, two in 2002 and 2003). With the 
exception of Act 49 of 1990 all nest have you intended to increase the levels of taxation, 
either with increased rates, broadening the base of tax benefits. These reforms have 
been messy, incoherent, fragmented, and not framed in a broader context that allows 
them to serve one or another type of state. 
 The comparative analysis performed on the balances in tax matters enables us to review 
the relevance of some assumptions. Throughout the twentieth century, governments 
have used different instruments to do exceptional goals state income tax and spending 
time critical and for which approval was not necessary to go through Congress. 
However, this decision has been successful in all cases in the income tax field, but not 
the costs. In Colombia it has managed to develop a type of welfare state that is capable 
of achieving fiscal balance through progressive income and expenditure size. Third, the 
State management reflecting changes in regulation tax is a state with a minimalist state. 
We have less state that territory. 
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Figure 1 
Expenses  total revenue of Central Government. Percentage of GDP 
(1950-2002) 
 
 
The black line is for the expenditure and revenue red. 
Source: Authors' calculations from DANE and the Bank of the 
Republic. 
Table 1 
Table 1 
 
Income and expenditure of the nonfinancial public 
  71 - 74 75 - 78 79 - 82 83 - 86 87 - 90 91 - 94 95 - 98 99 - 02 03 - 05 
Gastos           
Gastos de consumo del 
gobierno 9.6 8.0 9.4 9.6 8.9 10.4 15.2 17.6 14.3 
Seguridad y asistencia social 1.9 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.8 5.0 5.8 6.2 
En dinero 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.9 3.9 
En especie (salud) 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.8 1.9 1.3 
Otras prestaciones 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.0 
Inversión  5.5 6.2 6.9 7.9 7.1 7.0 7.5 6.5 6.7 
Adm.  públicas 3.2 3.3 3.4 2.8 3.0 3.4 4.5 3.6 4.4 
Empresas públicas 2.4 2.9 3.5 5.0 4.1 3.6 3.0 3.0 2.3 
Gasto primario 17.2 16.3 18.8 20.5 19.1 21.0 26.7 28.6 26.2 
Intereses netos pagados 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.7 1.3 3.3 4.2 
Gasto Total 17.7 16.7 19.4 21.3 20.0 21.7 28.1 31.9 30.4 
Ingresos          
Impuestos. regalías y tasas 12.0 13.9 11.9 11.9 13.6 15.4 15.8 17.8 19.4 
A la renta 4.6 4.4 2.9 2.3 3.2 5.2 4.7 5.3 6.7 
Otros. netos de subsidios 7.3 9.5 8.9 9.4 9.9 9.5 10.4 11.4 11.6 
Regalías 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.1 
Contr. a la seguridad social 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.3 3.3 4.0 5.4 4.8 4.2 
Util. emp. y rentas capital 0.9 0.1 0.7 1.7 2.2 3.2 4.3 5.1 4.6 
Intereses de la seg. social 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.4 
Ingresos totales 15.5 16.7 15.7 17.1 19.3 22.9 26.5 28.6 28.6 
          
Superavit (+) o déficit (-) -2.2 0.0 -3.6 -4.3 -0.7 1.1 -1.6 -3.3 -1.8 
Source: Ocampo (2007) 
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Figure 1 
 
Total public sector employment (1976-1995) 
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The vertical axis represents the number of public employees (thousands) on 
payroll that is, actually hired. Includes order national”, “central” and 
“decentralized levels . Departmental order, central and decentralized levels 
Order  municipal, local capital, central and decentralized levels. It does not 
include officials of the municipalities do not departmental capitals. 
 
*Teachers; **Sectional ***Health ****Services 
 
*****Sports ******Administration *******Boards 
 
Source: Commission for the Rationalization of Public Expenditure (1997). 
Chenery, Ocampo, Ramirez (1986). Since 1985 the values correspond to the 
last column of Table 2. 
Table 2 
 
Table 2 
 
Total public sector employment (1985-1995) 
 
 
 
 Central Descent Central Descent Mpios Descent Docentes Ser Sec. Jun. Ad. Total 
 Nacional Nacional Deptal Deptal Capital Mpal  Salud Deporte  
           
85 244620 158741 49267 27243 37725 40023 208869 17189 1784 785461 
86 274689 158009 51416 29633 37880 41273 211065 17021 1694 822680 
87 286084 169211 52668 34302 38445 40126 215547 23684 1706 861773 
88 318940 173903 56190 37942 38452 45235 215608 19995 1482 907747 
89 308983 170289 57055 40486 42874 46634 221195 21681 1471 910668 
90 321760 173830 55113 40073 45729 47904 224734 25670 1489 936302 
91 319864 150718 53443 39443 44166 51311 246806 25906 1794 933451 
92 337919 148362 53818 39872 46062 56112 236445 26857 1770 947217 
93 337525 138278 50992 39850 54582 60190 234781 18479 1769 936446 
94 347482 138110 48166 39840 60810 64113 231992 13186 1241 944940 
95 340491 137942 47265 39832 54666 64350 236269 13195 1253 935263 
 
No blanket to officials of the municipalities do not capitals. 
 
Source: Commission for the Rationalization of Public Expenditure (1997). Comptroller General of the 
Republic, Department of Public Administration, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, Ministry of 
Finance, DNP - Social Mission; DANE-MEN (C-600). In addition, some entities reported directly to the 
Commission. 
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Figura 2 
 
Participation (%) of public employment in total 
employment (1976-1995) 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
76 = 9.3; 77 = 9.4; 78 = 9.3; 79 = 9.4; 80 = 9.5; 81 = 
9.6; 82 = 9.5; 83 = 9.4; 84 = 9.1; 85 = 9.0; 86 = 9.1; 
87 = 8.9; 88 = 9.1; 89 = 8.7; 90 = 9.0; 91 = 8.4; 92 = 
8.3; 93 = 8.0; 94 = 7.9; 95 = 7.7 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The public employment data was taken from Table 2. 
Total employment is the number of paid staff - the 
national total - according to the DANE. 
 
Source: Commission for the Rationalization of Public 
Expenditure (1997). 
 
Table 3 
Table 3 
 
 
Distribution of the consolidated public sector expenditure by purpose. $ Million 
 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
         
Servicios públ. gener. 6.611.805 7.442.802 8.666.119 7.174.702 7.599.717 9.040.977 9.191.423 10.333.585 
Orden públ. seg. justic.  3.560.202 3.470.398 4.078.174 3.476.753 3.707.492 4.030.395 4.596.965 4.982.778 
Defensa 2.352.171 2.538.317 1.709.667 4.205.669 4.473.490 5.289.157 5.968.444 6.460.887 
Educación 4.678.944 6.793.029 7.828.156 8.159.728 10.489.908 11.221.853 12.450.906 13.992.201 
Sanidad 3.408.465 4.204.837 4.927.681 6.029.721 6.866.101 7.162.517 8.251.326 9.306.328 
Segur.y asist. social 8.317.098 8.894.082 9.476.750 12.215.826 12.709.594 15.322.252 16.178.632 19.272.594 
Vivi. y orden, urb-rural 683.159 941.327 818.721 1.363.897 1.336.852 1.063.220 948.730 1.239.940 
Otros serv. sociales 503.139 560.881 610.004 841.112 704.323 870.491 983.808 1.099.605 
Ser. econ. y otras final. 5.886.623 5.978.145 5.114.338 8.105.318 4.661.976 5.156.358 9.996.673 11.519.058 
Servicio deuda pública 7.912.705 10.800.697 12.714.534 17.310.753 25.382.290 27.216.273 26.736.872 27.639.893 
 |        
Total 43.914.311 51.624.515 55.944.144 68.883.478 77.931.742 86.373.492 95.303.779 105.846.870 
 
Includes the entire public sector (national, departments, municipalities, institutes, etc.). 
 
Source: González (2006). Estimates by Jairo Urdaneta and Margarita Betancur from DANE. 
 
Table 4 
Table 1 
 
Distribution of the consolidated public sector expenditure by purpose. Percentage of GDP 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
         
Servicios públicos generales  5.43 5.3 5.72 4.10 4.03 4.44 4.01 4.05 
Orden público seguridad y justicia  2.93 2.47 2.69 1.99 1.97 1.98 2.01 1.95 
Defensa 1.93 1.81 1.13 2.40 2.37 2.60 2.60 2.53 
Educación 3.84 4.84 5.16 4.67 5.56 5.52 5.43 5.49 
Sanidad 2.80 2.99 3.25 3.45 3.64 3.52 3.60 3.65 
Seguridad y asistencia social 6.83 6.33 6.25 6.98 6.74 7.53 7.06 7.56 
Vivienda y ordenación urbana y rural 0.56 0.67 0.54 0.78 0.71 0.52 0.41 0.49 
Otros servicios sociales 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.48 0.37 0.43 0.43 0.43 
Servic. económicos y otras final. 4.84 4.26 3.37 4.63 2.47 2.53 4.36 4.52 
Servicio deuda pública 6.50 7.70 8.41 9.90 13.50 13.41 11.71 10.80 
         
Total 36.08 36.75 36.91 39.39 41.33 42.45 41.58 41.49 
 
Fuente: Cuadro ¡Error! Marcador no definido. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Table 2 
 
Public Expenditure Management - $ Millions of current  
 
Gasto por Finalidad 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Adm.  pública general 3.991 4.933 5.643 7.411 8.750 11.350 14.256 18.110 24.670 36.624 
Defensa 1.775 3.781 2.203 2.399 2.958 3.893 4.311 5.986 8.112 11.376 
Educación 3.917 4.975 6.370 8.321 10.796 13.407 16.457 20.720 27.539 34.888 
Salud y sanidad 1.375 1.569 1.793 2.294 2.972 3.949 4.274 5.143 6.772 10.070 
Seg. y asistencia social 2.814 3.927 4.228 5.670 6.748 9.096 11.888 17.326 26.081 35.042 
Viv. orden. urbana y rural 613 738 917 1.379 1.209 1.452 1.719 2.428 2.383 2.717 
Serv. cultur. y recreativos 150 119 110 2.067 470 738 903 1.171 1.548 2.409 
Servicios económicos 7.198 8.066 8.657 12.924 14.289 9.982 19.639 42.693 46.113 51.301 
Deuda pública  1.350 1.430 1.887 2.219 2.969 7.650 3.445 3.878 5.320 6.089 
Total 23.183 29.538 31.808 44.684 51.161 61.517 76.892 117.455 148.538 190.516 
Fuente: DANE 
 
… below 2 
 
 
Gasto por Finalidad 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Adm.  pública general 51.952 70.313 91.756 119.876 149.664 188.929 246.743 349.455 
Defensa 16.930 20.258 24.561 36.238 44.050 62.981 74.877 99.124 
Educación 49.274 63.494 84.733 103.030 140.053 172.295 223.067 296.964 
Salud y sanidad 16.925 21.868 28.597 37.915 38.905 61.821 75.052 106.299 
Seg. y asistencia social 49.349 70.211 65.377 76.663 103.762 122.543 161.507 284.253 
Viv. orden. urbana y rural 5.576 5.427 8.814 11.082 9.939 9.963 19.647 28.394 
Serv. cultur. y recreativos 2.890 3.047 3.970 23.085 7.238 9.614 13.146 23.338 
Servicios económicos 76.648 128.399 147.206 163.028 202.049 263.399 233.313 533.561 
Deuda pública  9.835 14.452 22.766 23.210 33.635 35.943 67.970 124.493 
Total 279.379 397.469 477.780 594.127 729.295 927.488 1.115.322 1.845.881 
Fuente: DANE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Below table 2 
 
 
 
 
Gasto por Finalidad 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Adm.  pública general 436.611 574.527 790.220 997.558 1.411.172 1.770.711 3.554.154 
Defensa 150.194 211.388 253.600 324.686 469.740 587.544 814.738 
Educación 373.350 477.017 604.302 803.819 1.094.197 1.403.663 1.890.498 
Salud y sanidad 135.519 185.109 237.914 295.922 356.434 686.792 1.297.821 
Seg. y asistencia social 305.398 429.177 586.737 805.606 1.145.649 1.561.784 3.097.060 
Viv. orden. urbana y rural 29.944 43.603 63.934 115.130 139.585 194.008 266.579 
Serv. cultur. y recreativos 27.127 35.090 54.695 69.067 77.822 130.471 205.900 
Servicios económicos 576.282 750.974 952.395 1.285.874 1.670.912 2.186.825 2.806.047 
Deuda pública  125.443 156.413 245.599 321.078 372.542 668.056 675.487 
Total 2.159.868 2.863.298 3.789.396 5.018.740 6.738.053 9.189.854 14.608.284 
Fuente: DANE 
 
Table ¡Error! Marcador no definido. 
 
 Public Expenditure Management - Percentage of GDP 
 
Gasto por Finalidad 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Adm.  pública general 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.3 
Defensa 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.9 
Educación 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.8 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.8 
Salud y sanidad 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0 
Seg. y asistencia social 2.6 3.0 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.7 
Viv. orden. urbana y rural 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Serv. cultur. y recreativos 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Servicios económicos 4.1 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.4 4.5 2.9 5.1 
Deuda pública  0.5 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.2 
Total 14.9 16.9 16.1 16.4 15.9 15.7 13.8 17.6 
Fuente: DANE 
 
Below table 6 
 
 
Gasto por Finalidad 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Adm.  pública general 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.3 
Defensa 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.9 
Educación 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.8 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.8 
Salud y sanidad 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0 
Seg. y asistencia social 2.6 3.0 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.7 
Viv. orden. urbana y rural 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Serv. cultur. y recreativos 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Servicios económicos 4.1 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.4 4.5 2.9 5.1 
Deuda pública  0.5 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.2 
Total 14.9 16.9 16.1 16.4 15.9 15.7 13.8 17.6 
Fuente: DANE 
 
Below table ¡Error! Marcador no definido.. 
 
 
Gasto por Finalidad 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Adm.  pública general 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.6 3.4 5.3 
Defensa 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 
Educación 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.8 
Salud y sanidad 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.9 
Seg. y asistencia social 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.0 4.6 
Viv. orden. urbana y rural 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Serv. cultur. y recreativos 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Servicios económicos 4.1 4.2 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 
Deuda pública  0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.0 
Total 15.5 15.9 15.8 16.1 17.0 17.6 21.6 
Fuente: DANE 
 
 
FIG. 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 3 
Public Administration expenditure by purpose 
(financial services): education, health and social 
security. Percentage of GDP (1970-1994). 
 
 
The upper curve (red) corresponds to economic services. 
The middle curve (green) is public spending on education. 
And the lower curve (blue) corresponds to expenditure on 
health and social security. Source Table 6 
Table 7 
Table 7 
 
Public employment, number of people - national, central level (1985-1995) 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
            
Fuer. Mil. - Pie 
fuerza - 
86860 95684 110089 129155 113628 127397 125615 126219 131273 136911 145636 
Pol. Nac. - Pie fuerza 
- 
60512 63231 65895 67715 71072 71950 75629 82551 82769 92159 90683 
Rama Judicial 17779 18723 22809 22809 22538 21255 19457 19534 20295 20325 20916 
Fisc. General - - - - - - - 8564 8815 15494 18692 
Fuer. Mil. -Adminis- 11935 18366 11996 11994 13044 12886 12868 13046 15837 17532 14880 
Min. de Hacienda 12914 12930 10927 10970 11348 9264 8350 10423 7175 7320 8086 
Dep/to  de Seguridad 4419 5820 5771 5503 5396 6152 5848 5649 6116 7542 6450 
Pol. Nacional - 
Admini- 
6524 6511 6443 6804 6800 7017 5121 7249 7267 7786 6368 
Contr. Gen. de la 
Rep. 
9914 9883 9585 9465 9792 9419 10258 8832 6018 3873 4486 
Reg. Nal. del 
Est.Civil 
3318 12588 8004 13578 13835 13597 14604 14604 19180 16960 3380 
Proc. Gen. de la 
Nación 
2117 2350 2281 2213 2551 3939 3939 2712 2821 2898 2834 
Congreso de la Rep. 2574 2574 3550 2847 2557 2559 2559 2183 2323 2322 2550 
Super. de Notariado 240 240 240 254 326 326 326 326 300 2287 2296 
Ministerio de Salud 934 988 957 920 946 915 943 3034 2377 2347 1377 
Min.de Trabajo 1313 1315 1273 1322 1339 1339 1405 1399 1180 1218 1357 
Min. de Rel. Exter. 1093 1093 997 993 1030 1010 1085 1177 1238 1496 1310 
Min. de Transporte 2709 2600 5666 12035 11657 10982 10652 9324 5623 1023 1013 
Super. Bancaria 788 788 788 803 803 803 777 777 634 689 746 
Min. del Medio 
Amb. 
- - - - - - - - - 299 637 
Ministerio del 
Interior 
394 394 365 374 443 443 432 451 542 544 576 
Dep/to Nal. de 
Planeac. 
388 388 426 429 496 542 550 558 608 558 538 
Ministerio de 
Educación 
1120 1121 965 951 903 1070 1070 1907 539 575 535 
DANE 1191 1179 1150 1159 1146 1157 1138 1087 1064 537 516 
Min. de Comunicac. 455 450 450 455 449 454 461 453 456 500 510 
Presidencia de la 
Rep. 
309 289 433 497 528 686 503 514 539 600 493 
Ministerio de Minas 433 433 416 511 507 512 481 475 401 474 475 
Dep/to  de 
Cooperativas 
436 447 462 462 469 466 466 448 453 443 457 
Super. de Sociedades 366 366 366 484 484 484 484 74 310 311 382 
Ministerio de Justicia 7223 7116 6957 7117 7450 7525 7565 6906 7442 356 343 
Min. de Agricultura 502 503 508 343 425 431 390 385 418 266 274 
Dep/to de la Func. 
Públ. 
250 251 241 253 282 285 276 268 263 249 247 
Min. de Com. 
Exterior 
- - - - - - - 181 195 291 223 
Super. de Ind. y 
Com. 
225 225 225 290 290 290 290 290 185 213 216 
Super. de Salud 98 98 98 98 98 148 148 148 226 181 181 
Super. de Ser. 
Públicos 
- - - - - - - - - 245 180 
Super. de Valores - - - - - - - 121 154 154 180 
Ministerio de 
Desarrollo 
90 90 90 104 127 185 194 166 178 187 179 
Super. de Vig. 
Seg.Priv. 
- - - - - - - - 194 194 134 
Super. de Sub. 
Familiar 
62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45 56 56 79 
Super. de Puertos - - - - - - - 68 68 68 76 
Ofic. de Reg. de 
IIPP. 
1679 1679 1679 1921 1952 1952 1952 1952 1940 - - 
Veeduría del Tesoro - - - - - - - 15 55 - - 
Dep/to de Aer. Civil 3111 3564 3553 3683 3844 3886 3713 3553 - - - 
Dep/to de Intend.y 
Com. 
99 106 121 121 123 123 - - - - - 
Fonade 61 59 61 62 63 70 74 72 - - - 
Super. de Camb. 185 185 185 185 180 180 180 180 - - - 
            
TOTAL 244620 274689 286084 318940 308983 321760 319864 337919 337525 347482 340491 
The entities are sorted by the number of public employees they had in 1995. Source: Commission for the 
Rationalization of Expenditure (1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Table 8 
Public Employment - Participation (%) of each entity in the total - national, central level, more teachers (1985-1995) 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
            
Docentes 46.1 43.5 43.0 40.3 41.7 41.1 43.6 41.2 41.0 40.0 41.0 
Fuer. Milit. - Pie fuerza - 19.2 19.7 21.9 24.2 21.4 23.3 22.2 22.0 22.9 23.6 25.3 
Policía Nacional - Pie fuerza - 13.3 13.0 13.1 12.7 13.4 13.2 13.3 14.4 14.5 15.9 15.7 
Rama Judicial 3.9 3.9 4.5 4.3 4.3 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 
Fiscalía General de la Nación - - - - - - - 1.5 1.5 2.7 3.2 
Fuer. Milit. -Adminis- 2.6 3.8 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.8 3.0 2.6 
Min. de Hacienda y C. P. 2.8 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.4 
Policía Nacional - Admini- 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 
Dep/to Adm. de Seguridad 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.1 
Contraloría General de la Rep. 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.8 
Registr. Nal. del Estado Civil 0.7 2.6 1.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 3.4 2.9 0.6 
Procur. General de la Nación 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Congreso de la Rep. 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Super. de Notariado y Registro 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 
Min. de Salud 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 
Min. de Relaciones Exteriores 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Min. de Transporte 0.6 0.5 1.1 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.0 0.2 0.2 
Min. de Trabajo y Seg. Social 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Min. de Justicia 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 0.1 0.1 
DANE 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Dep/to Adm. Nal. de Coop. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Dep/to Nal. de Planeación 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Min. de Comunicaciones 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Min. de Educación Nacional 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Min. de Minas y Energía 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Min. del Interior 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Presidencia de la Rep. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Super. Bancaria 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Super. de Sociedades 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Min. del Medio Ambiente - - - - - - - - - 0.1 0.1 
Min. de Comercio Exterior - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Min. de Agricultura 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Dep/to Adm. de la Func. 
Pública 
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. de Control de Cambios 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. de Industria y Comercio 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. de Subsidio Familiar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. de Valores - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. de Vig. y Seg.Privada - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. General de Puertos - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. Nacional de Salud 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. de Servicios Públicos - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 
Oficinas de Registro de IIPP. 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 - - 
Veeduría del Tesoro - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 - - 
Dep/to Adm, de Aeron. Civil 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 - - - 
Dep/to Adm. de Intend. y 
Com. 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - - - 
Fonade 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - 
Min. de Desarrollo Económico 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - 
            
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The entities are in order of participation they had in 1995.Source: Commission for the Rationalization of Expenditure 
(1997). 
 
 
 
 
 Table 9  
Table 9. 
Public Employment - Participation (%) accumulated - national, central level, most teachers (1985-1995). 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
            
Docentes 46.1 43.5 43.0 40.3 41.7 41.1 43.6 41.2 41.0 40.0 41.0 
Fuerz. Militares - Pie fuerza - 65.2 63.1 64.9 64.5 63.2 64.4 65.7 63.1 64.0 63.7 66.2 
Policía Nacional - Pie fuerza - 78.6 76.2 78.1 77.2 76.6 77.6 79.1 77.5 78.4 79.6 81.9 
Rama Judicial 82.5 80.0 82.6 81.4 80.8 81.5 82.5 80.9 82.0 83.1 85.6 
Fiscalía Gen. de la Nación 82.5 80.0 82.6 81.4 80.8 81.5 82.5 82.4 83.5 85.7 88.8 
Fuerz. Militares -Adminis- 85.1 83.8 85.0 83.7 83.3 83.8 84.8 84.7 86.3 88.8 91.4 
Min. de Hacienda y C. P. 88.0 86.5 87.2 85.7 85.4 85.5 86.2 86.5 87.5 90.0 92.8 
Dep/to Adm. de Seguridad 88.9 87.7 88.3 86.8 86.4 86.7 87.3 87.5 88.6 91.3 93.9 
Policía Nacional - Admini- 90.4 89.0 89.6 88.0 87.7 88.0 88.2 88.7 89.9 92.7 95.0 
Contraloría Gen. de la Repúb. 92.6 91.0 91.5 89.8 89.6 89.7 90.0 90.3 90.9 93.3 95.8 
            
 
Las entidades están ordenadas en función del número de empleados públicos que tenía en 1995. 
Fuente: Comisión de Racionalización del Gasto (1997) 
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FIG. 4 
 
 
Evolution of taxes (direct and indirect) of the 
National Central Government (1962-2002): 
Percentage of GDP 
 
 
Source: Author calculations from the DANE and the 
Central Bank 
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FIG 5 
Evolution of indirect taxes National Central 
Government (1962-2002): Percentage of GDP. 
 
 
 
The black line corresponds to indirect taxes and the 
red to direct taxes. Source: Authors' calculations from 
the DNAE and the Central Bank. 
 
Table 10 
Table 10 
Major tax rules 
José Manuel Marroquín 1897   Aumento al impuesto al tabaco, fósforo y cigarrillo 
Manuel Reyes 1905 Ley 59 
Aumento en la tarifa de aduanas y nacionalización de los 
impuestos departamentales 
José Vicente Concha 
1914-
1917 
Leyes 26 y 69 
- decreto 2089 
Creación de impuestos al consumo suntuario (cerveza, 
fósforos, naipe). 
Marco Fidel Suárez 1918 Ley 56 Establece el impuesto de renta 
Enrique Olaya Herrera 1931 Ley 81 
Renta a las sociedades, las deducciones por depreciación.  Se 
establece el sistema de retención en la fuente 
Alfonso López Pumarejo 1935 Ley 78 Crea impuesto sobre exceso de utilidades y sobre patrimonio 
Alfonso López Pumarejo 1942 Ley 45 
Sobretasa a la renta por los efectos de la Segunda Guerra 
Mundial 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 1953 
Decretos 2317 
y 2615 
Gravo los dividendos distribuidos por las sociedades anónimas 
en cabeza de los socios, establece la doble tributación 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 1956   
Sobretasa del 20% en impuesto a la renta debido a crisis fiscal 
por bajos precios del café 
Alberto Lleras Camargo 1960 Ley 81 
Gravó las ganancias de capital e incorporó un régimen de 
presunción de renta sobre la propiedad rural 
Guillermo León Valencia 1963 Ley 21 
Creo impuesto a las ventas vigente desde 1965. Sobretasa de 
de 20% impuesto de renta por dos años 
Guillermo León Valencia 1963 
Decreto Ley 
3190 
Establece la retención en la fuente sobre toda clase de ingreso 
gravable 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo 1966 Decreto 2933 
Establece tasa máxima de retención en la fuente de 10% 
sobre salarios 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo 1967 
Decreto 444 - 
ley 64 de 1967 
Impuestos sobre remesas del exterior e impuesto a la gasolina 
y el acpm 
Misael Pastrana Borrero 1973 Leyes 4, 5, 6 
Renta presuntiva en el agro. Amplia exenciones personales 
del sector agropecuario. Modifica el impuesto básico de renta 
a personas jurídicas.  En renta fija una tasa única de 40% para 
las "sociedades anónimas y asimiladas" y otra del 20% para 
las "limitadas y asimiladas". Eleva la tarifa  máxima del 
impuesto de renta a las personas naturales del 52% al 56%. 
Amplia base IVA. 
Alfonso López Michelsen 
1974-
1975 
Decr. 2053, 
2348, 2247,  
ley 49  
Moderniza el sistema tributario.  Busca que la tributación 
responda a un nuevo enfoque de Estado, compatible con las 
medidas de liberalización de la economía. 
Belisario Betancur 1983 Leyes 9 y 14 
Reducción en las tasas: la tasa marginal máxima del impuesto 
de renta pasó de 56% a 49%.  IVA con una tasa única a 10%. 
Eliminó la doble tributación de las sociedades anónimas. 
Virgilio Barco Vargas 1986 Ley 75 
Reducción de las tasas máximas de renta. La máxima pasó a 
30%.  El 90% de los salarios exentos de retención. Elimina la 
doble tributación. 
César Gaviría Trujillo 1990 Ley 44 
Facultad de los contribuyentes para fijar avalúo del inmueble. 
Sistema de tarifas flexibles para el impuesto predial unificado 
César Gaviría Trujillo 1990 Ley 49 
Amnistía que permite la entrada de capitales colombianos 
puestos en el exterior. Incremento del IVA del 10% al 12%. 
Reducción del arancel promedio del 16.5% al 7%. 
César Gaviría Trujillo 1992 Ley 6 
Sobretasa del 25% sobre el impuesto a la renta. Aumento del 
IVA del 12% al 14%. IVA de 35% - 45% para bienes de lujo. 
César Gaviría Trujillo 1993 Ley 100 Incremento en 10% de los impuesto de nómina 
Ernesto Samper Pizano 1994 Ley 174 
Ajustes por inflación. Le dio piso legal a las tarifas de retención 
en la fuente.  
Ernesto Samper Pizano 1995 Ley 223 
Renta presuntiva de 1,5% sobre patrimonio bruto y aumenta la 
renta presuntiva sobre el patrimonio liquido a 5%.  Aumenta la 
tasa de renta del 30% para personas jurídicas. Eliminó la 
doble tributación. Aumenta la tasa del IVA a 16% 
Andrés Pastrana Arango 1998 
Decretos 2330 
y 2331 
Emergencia económica. Crea el impuesto a las transacciones 
financieras (2 x 1000) 
Andrés Pastrana Arango 1998 Ley 488 
Nuevos contribuyentes del impuesto a la renta: cajas de 
compensación familiar y fondo de empleados, asociaciones 
gremiales.  Elimina renta presuntiva sobre patrimonio bruto.  
IVA se reduce de 16% a 15%. Sobretasa a la gasolina. 
Andrés Pastrana Arango 2000 Ley 633 
Modifica renta presuntiva. La tarifa general del IVA es del 16%.  
El gravamen a los movimientos financieros se eleva al 3x1000) 
Álvaro Uribe Vélez 2002 Ley 788 
Sobretasa a la renta equivalente al 10%.  IVA diferenciales del  
2%, 7% 
Álvaro Uribe Vélez 2003 Ley 863 
Sobretasa del 10% a renta.  Impuesto de 0,3% al patrimonio. 
Determinó una deducción de 2 puntos del IVA para compras 
de crédito 
Source: From Junguito and Rincon (2007 b). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
